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Canadian Foreign Terrorist Fighters: A Gendered Perspective of Activities and Outcomes

Research Report

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*The views presented are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Department of Defense, the Department of the Navy, or the Naval Postgraduate School.

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INTRODUCTION

Since 1990, thousands of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) from Canada and other Western countries have traveled to countries like Iraq, Bosnia, Syria, and Somalia to join conflicts and terrorist organizations (UNODC, n.d.; Pokalova, 2020). In recruitment efforts, these volunteer efforts are romanticized (Van Leuvan, Mazaurna & Gordon, 2016). In reality, many of these individuals are killed, some remain in seemingly perpetual violence, and others have attempted to repatriate or are held in detention camps. Despite key research contributions (e.g., Dawson, Rostami, Mondani, Harris-Hogan & Amarasingam, 2025; Harris-Hogan, Amarasingam & Dawson, 2024), we know little about the outcomes of Canadian FTFs and even less about gender differences in participation.

To design effective FTF policies, we must know more about these individuals. With political changes in Syria, many FTFs have attempted to return to Canada. Unlike many of its' allies, the revocation of citizenship for FTFs is not a legal tool available to the Canadian government. Many consider allowing FTFs to return to Canada to be extremely dangerous (Malet &

Hayes, 2018) and prosecuting them faces hurdles. With the recent return of FTFs being predominantly female, it is important to analyze gender differences in the histories and outcomes of FTFs. Specifically, we seek to answer three research questions:

- 1) What are the differences in the backgrounds of FTFs, their destination countries, and the success of their travel attempts by gender?
- 2) What have been the outcomes for Canadian FTFs (e.g., criminal sanctions, death)?
- 3) Do women, who have been viewed as taking a more supportive role, face similar outcomes as men?

Despite widescale consensus regarding the risk posed by these individuals, these questions remain particularly salient in a Canadian context now that many FTFs either remain abroad or attempt to repatriate. This report uses a new database of 129 Canadian FTFs who traveled between 1990 to 2025 to explore their backgrounds and outcomes with an emphasis on the influence of gender. We

assess the use of peace bonds, arrest rates, charges, adjudication methods, sentence lengths, and cause of death. To extend previous examinations of FTFs, our data includes a wide range of destination countries and information about individuals who have traveled and returned to Canada multiple times. We also expand the range of information collected, including collecting data on birth countries. Previous research on Canadian FTFs found a higher representation of females compared to other Western countries (Dawson et al., 2025). Though our data on Canadian FTFs, looking at the years 1990 – 2025, identifies more males and fewer females than other collection efforts (e.g. Harris-Hogan et al., 2024; Dawson et al., 2025), this is likely due to sample inclusion differences and differential data collection methods.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The conflict in Syria exerted an especially powerful recruitment force, drawing foreign terrorist fighters from many Western nations, including Canada. The Syrian Civil War erupted in 2011 following mass anti-government protests that spread across the country. The war was extraordinarily deadly; civilian casualty estimates range up to 650,000 along with tens of thousands of military losses on all sides (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 2025). The war involved stakeholders from across the globe, with Iraq, US, Russia, Turkey, Israel, Iran, and the Gulf States, all playing direct roles. The conflict contributed to the rise

and fall of ISIS and the Caliphate (Aldoughli, 2025), leading to the displacement of over thirteen million people (Jassem & Arroyo, 2025) and over six million global refugees (Joireman, 2025). However, people did not just leave Syria. Encouraged by social media (Basit, 2014), tens of thousands of non-Syrians traveled to Syria to fight for the Rebels, the Islamic State, the Syrian Democratic Forces, or pro-government militias, motivated by religion, ideology, politics, or money (Morris, 2024; Mishali-Ram, 2018; Pokalova, 2019). Their extensive role was a signature feature of the Syrian Civil War (Schmid, 2015). For example, support for the rise of the Islamic State Caliphate across Western Iraq and Eastern Syria motivated Sunni Muslim foreign fighters: “the desire to defend and expand this ‘Islamic state’ became an imbedded part of their so-called holy sojourn to Syria and Iraq” (Basit, 2014, p. 5).

Government Policies

The rise in the number of FTFs returning to their home countries after participating in conflicts has prompted governments to develop comprehensive strategies aimed at managing this phenomenon. These strategies often involve a combination of judicial, rehabilitative, and reintegration efforts, which must be tailored to the specific needs of individuals as well as the broader community context (UNODC, 2017). Given that some FTFs return home to conduct attacks, others seek to flee

dangerous conditions for safety, meaning that balancing the security and social support mandates of governance can often pose unique challenges (Cragin, 2017a; Wright, 2020). Consequently, governments adopt diverse strategies ranging from denying repatriation, to national security screening and monitoring upon return, and targeted rehabilitation and reintegration programs designed to address drivers of radicalization (Jawaid, 2017; Stenger, 2023).

Governments generally respond to returning FTFs through a mix of criminal prosecution and security-driven restrictions. Many countries impose terrorism-related criminal charges on returnees to address public safety risks and deter others from travelling abroad to join extremist groups. For example, in Canada, Hiva Mohammad Alizadeh, who had trained with terrorists in Afghanistan, pleaded guilty in 2014 to possession of an explosive substance with intent to benefit a terrorist group and received a long prison sentence under Canada's anti-terror laws, illustrating a traditional prosecutorial approach to individuals linked with extremist causes (Amirault, Bouchard, Farrell & Andresen, 2016; Public Prosecution Service of Canada, 2014; Zaia, 2017). There were attempts to remove Mr. Alizadeh's citizenship, but ultimately, they were unsuccessful. Similarly, Rehab Dughmash – a Toronto-area woman convicted of terrorism-related offences after engaging in violent conduct connected to ISIS ideology

– shows how legal systems apply existing terrorism statutes to individuals who have demonstrated localized threats after radicalization (Nesbitt & Wylie, 2020; Pokalova, 2019; Wark, 2018). These prosecutions reflect states' reliance on criminal law to manage perceived risks posed by returning or home-grown extremists where evidence is sufficient for conviction.

Attempts to prosecute may be insufficient or problematic as a sole policy response, especially when evidence of specific acts abroad is hard to obtain or validate to meet the legal burden of proof, or when families – including women and children – return. Thus, a significant aspect of government policies involves rehabilitation and reintegration programs designed for returnees (Ingram, Coleman, Doctor & Margolin, 2022; Jawaid, 2017). These programs typically seek to reduce recidivism rates and ensure that FTFs have access to meaningful livelihoods that do not involve illicit activities (UNODC, 2017). Effective rehabilitation programs require a robust set of inputs and resources, including the collaboration of government officials, child welfare agencies, and mental health professionals, to provide comprehensive support to returnees (UNODC, n.d.). Examples of the multi-sector support necessary for successful rehabilitation can be seen in the context of other post-conflict efforts, such as Sierra Leone and Liberia (Medeiros, 2007), as well as within the extremist landscape

(Githigaro, 2024). Furthermore, some governments are exploring the involvement of "formers" or "defectors" in messaging campaigns aimed at countering extremist narratives, enhancing the credibility of rehabilitation efforts and community acceptance (Speckhard, Shaikovci & Yayla, 2018).

Countries have adopted varied approaches to the repatriation of their nationals involved in extremist activities. While some European Union nations restrict or condition return, others actively repatriate, prosecute when possible, and build reintegration support into broader counter-terrorism policy frameworks (Coolsaet & Renard, 2018; Renard, 2023; Rigotti & Barboza, 2022). For example, while the Netherlands has taken a categorical "no" stance on repatriation (De Bie, De Poot & Van Der Leun, 2015; Paulussen, Nijman & Lismont, 2017), other nations, like France and Belgium, have begun to reconsider their policies in light of judicial decisions and changing security dynamics (Coolsaet & Renard, 2018; Mehra & Paulussen, 2019; Van Ostaeyen & Van Vlierden, 2018).

Examples of Returned Foreign Fighter Violence

Along with attempted attacks like that of Rehab Dughmash in Scarborough, Ontario, there have been a number of deadly attacks by returned FTFs (or those who attempted to travel and were denied like Ms. Dughmash) across the world,

especially in Europe. French citizen Mehdi Nemmouche traveled to Syria in 2012 to fight alongside ISIS. He saw combat in Aleppo, supported the imprisonment of a number of Westerners, and participated in the torture and murder of four French journalists held hostage (The Counter Extremism Project, 2025). In the first European violence by a fighter returning from Syria, he killed four people at the Jewish Museum in Brussels on May 24, 2014 (The Counter Extremism Project, 2025).

Among the most violent incidents by returned foreign terrorist fighters occurred in Paris on November 13, 2015. A coordinated set of attacks conducted by nine terrorists, seven of whom were foreign terrorist fighter returnees, killed 130 people and wounded over 350 (Cragin, 2017b). Targets included a theater, a soccer stadium, and multiple restaurants and bars (The New York Times, 2016). ISIS claimed credit for these incidents, constituting the deadliest terrorist attack ever to occur in France (Cragin, 2017b).

Returning FTFs pose a security threat for a variety of reasons. First, their training and battle experiences abroad can provide them with lethal combat skills and comfort with violence (Byman, 2015). This not only makes them individually dangerous but can be of larger concern as FTFs can "transfer new tactics, techniques, and procedures between conflict zones" (Cragin, 2025, p. 57). Second, their experiences may have

increased already heightened levels of religious and ideological passion, and worsened or triggered psychological issues, exacerbated their sense of being victimized and unwelcome in their home country (Borum & Fein, 2017). Especially in the social media age, FTFs might return home with networks that support violence and encourage extremism (Center for Security Studies Study, 2014). Even those who were not successful in their attempted travels to a conflict zone can pose a risk should they attempt to fulfil their goals domestically, such as the case of Rehab Dughmash. Byman (2015) sums up the threat foreign fighters pose:

Many of those who go to war will come back as hardened veterans, steady in the face of danger and skilled in the use of weapons and explosives—ideal terrorist recruiting material. More importantly, their worldview may change. While in the conflict zone, they will form networks with other radicals, embrace techniques like suicide bombings and beheadings, and establish ties to jihadists around the world, making them prone to further radicalization and giving them access to training and weapons they might otherwise lack (p. 582).

Likewise, American former President Barack Obama declared at the UN Security Council that FTFs “...exacerbate conflicts; they pose an immediate threat to people in these regions; and...they may try to return

to their home countries to carry out deadly attacks” (Obama, September 24, 2014). Traditionally, it was thought that FTFs died in battle (often while being used as disposable troops), settled in their host countries, or became conflict nomads traveling from fight to fight. Instead, recent research finds a simpler outcome – many go home. “[L]aw enforcement and other security officials should expect roughly 80% of the foreign fighter populations in Syria and Iraq to return home after a ceasefire” (Cragin 2017a, p. 306). Upon coming home, these foreign fighters engage in violence at high rates (Cragin 2017a; 2025). As a result of these concerns, returning FTFs, and especially those from the Syrian Civil War, are widely perceived as a security concern for their more than one hundred countries of origin (Fainberg 2017; Pokalova 2019).

Gendered Dimensions of Returning FTFs

The scholarly literature on foreign fighters has historically centered on the figure of the male combatant, reflecting both the demographic reality that men constitute the overwhelming majority of those who travelled to join groups such as the Islamic State (IS) and an analytical bias that treated gender as peripheral rather than constitutive of the phenomenon. Early foundational work by Thomas Hegghammer (2010, 2013) on the foreign fighter trajectory said relatively little about gender, establishing a template that subsequent

scholars would later critique as implicitly masculinized (Gregg, 2023). It was not until the dramatic scale of IS recruitment after 2013, and particularly the visibility of women travelling to the so-called Caliphate from across the world, that gender became a sustained object of analysis in its own right.

Research on women who travelled to IS territory has complicated the persistent victim/perpetrator binaries long discussed by academics. For example, Cook and Vale's (2019) analysis of IS women documented the diverse roles that women occupied: wives, mothers, propagandists, enforcers in the al-Khansaa Brigade, and in some cases direct participants in violence. Vale's subsequent reports on women and children returning from IS territory (2019) highlighted the operational and ideological agency many women exercised, arguing against a default assumption of coercion that has substantial policy implications for how returnees are prosecuted or diverted into rehabilitation programs. Millar (2025) has theoretically interrogated how masculinity itself structures participation in political violence and how the "warrior" script shapes both recruitment and the experience of return, themes developed in her work on gender and security studies more broadly.

On the question of return specifically, the extant literature highlights asymmetries in how male and female returnees are treated legally and socially. Western legal systems

have frequently struggled to apply existing terrorism statutes to women, either because the statutes were drafted with male combatants in mind or because prosecutors and courts defaulted to presumptions of passivity (Stenger, 2023, 2024). This has produced inconsistent outcomes; some female returnees face prosecution for membership offences, others are treated primarily as victims of trafficking or coercive control, and still others have been denaturalized or left in limbo in third-country detention camps such as al-Hol in Syria (Kakhki, 2021). The United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT, n.d.) and the Global Counterterrorism Forum (2022) have issued guidance documents noting that gender-blind reintegration programs risk both under-prosecuting genuinely dangerous individuals and over-securitizing women who were coerced.

A smaller but growing body of work examines men's experiences of return through an explicitly gendered lens, pushing back against the assumption that gender analysis is synonymous with the study of women. For example, scholars have drawn on critical masculinity studies to argue that disengagement and deradicalization programs often implicitly reinforce hegemonic masculinity, offering men vocational training, social status, and familial reintegration, in ways that may inadvertently reproduce some of the same masculine identity rewards that made foreign fighting attractive in the first place

(Bloom, 2025; Robinson, 2026; Rothermel & Shepherd, 2023; Stenger, 2024). This literature calls for reintegration frameworks attentive not merely to the gender of returnees but to the gendered ideologies they carried back with them, including IS's elaborately theorized patriarchal order.

Overall, the field has moved from treating gender as an afterthought to recognizing it as structurally central to recruitment, participation, and the politics of return. Notable research gaps remain, however, particularly regarding non-Western return contexts, the long-term outcomes of repatriated women and children beyond the immediate security framing, and intersectional analyses that attend to race, class, and nationality alongside gender.

METHODS

Foreign terrorist fighters represent a highly understudied group. This lack of attention is surprising given the increasing number of returnees from Western countries associated with ISIS during the last decade (Jensen, James & Tinsley, 2016). The existing knowledge on FTFs is limited due to the blurred line between 'supporting' a violent non-state organization and 'fighting' for it, the lack of evidence of individuals' actions abroad, and limited personal details (Pokalova, 2020). This issue is even more prominent for female FTFs. To fill this gap, the researchers developed a comprehensive database on FTFs (the Canadian Foreign Terrorist Fighters

Database; CFTFD). Unlike previous analyses of Canadian FTFs (Dawson et al., 2025; Harris-Hogan et al., 2024), our sample includes FTFs from 1990-2025 who traveled to any country, and those that are known to have attempted to travel, even if they were not arrested for it.

To be included in the CFTFD, individuals must meet the following criteria:

- 1) be born in or established official residency in Canada, temporarily or permanently (e.g., those living in Canada as students are included, but those visiting are not).
- 2) Travel, attempt to travel, plan travel, or be suspected of traveling to any other country for the purposes of joining a terrorist organization, receiving training from a terrorist organization, marrying or living with the members of a terrorist organization, or committing terrorist activities in support of a terrorist group or their associated ideological movements.

The CFTFD was developed by a multidisciplinary research team and includes over ninety variables organized within the following six major categories: 1) Logistics (administrative); 2) Demographics (e.g., nativity, citizenship, race, gender, age at travel, marriage, education); 3) History (e.g., prior arrests and convictions, recruitment methods, use of social media); 4) Activities (e.g., fatalities, ideology, group membership, travel details, training, country

of action); 5) Criminal Justice (e.g., arrest, sentencing, appeal, citizenship revocation, deradicalization programming); and 6) Status (e.g., last known location, cause of death, method of return).

Following Institutional Review Board approval,¹ the researchers identified 129 FTFs from Canada and systematically collected data on them from publicly available or open sources (i.e., case documents, government press releases, media articles). The research team followed procedures similar to other open-source databases on extremists such as the Extremist Crime Database (Freilich, Chermak, Belli, Gruenewald & Parkin, 2014). To begin identifying individuals, the researchers combed existing databases that include Canadian extremists from 1990-present (such as the International Crimes Database), official (i.e., government) sources, scholarly and journalistic accounts, and conducted systematic reviews of watch group reports and media outlets. While the initial push focused heavily on subject identification, the process has also been iterative. If additional individuals were later identified, they were included. Search link files were generated for each individual. Researchers were assigned names and provided a series of protocols to follow to search for open-source data on each. Primary search engines were used initially including

ProQuest, Westlaw, Canadian Newsstream, and Google. Following this initial search, secondary search engines including Google Scholar, Google Video, Google News, and Homeland Security Digital Library were also employed.

Researchers combed through the data to code the information for each subject specified in the CFTFD data template. To avoid missed information and coding errors, each individual was separately coded by two researchers. These codes were then 'normed' collaboratively in consultation with the Principal Investigator (PI) to ensure fidelity to the data. After norming, the PI reviewed the final codes before their inclusion in the dataset. It should be noted that a limitation in this approach is that the data is reliant, in terms of comprehensiveness and reliability, on what is made publicly available in open-source documents; for example, certain attributes, such as employment details or mental health status, are often under-reported to protect individual privacy. Nonetheless, this approach is commonly used in the terrorism and security studies literatures, as it provides the most comprehensive source of data possible for analysis (e.g., Dmello, Perliger & Sweeney, 2022; Horgan, Shortland, Abbasciano and Walsh, 2016), barring access to restricted or classified documents.

¹ This protocol was approved by Georgia Southern University's Institutional Review Board (Protocol #: H24163).

Data Analysis

The CFTFD includes information on 129 FTFs from 1990-2025 across 90 variables and 6 categories. In the results section we describe descriptive statistics for a dozen different variables. In selecting variables, we aimed to include data that had a meaningful amount of complete data, with a specific focus on CJS outcomes and the characteristics that might be associated with them based on what has been seen in the past with other types of offenders. Also, we included information we view as potentially important that has not been previously considered, such as success of travel or death.

The data represent the population of FTFs from Canada between 1990 and 2025. We do not view them as a sample to generalize to other countries as Canada has unique FTF attributes that differentiate it from other Western countries like the United States, Great Britain, and France. This sample is also not intended to generalize to Canadian FTFs across other time periods as the Syrian Civil War in particular is a unique, driving force historically. Instead, we see these figures as representing the population of Canadian FTFs across 35 years (1990-2025). Thus, while we provide descriptive statistics for the variables, we do not conduct significance testing as we are explicitly not attempting to generalize the data as a sample. In the next section, we

describe to the similarities and differences of the 129 Canadian FTFs across more than a dozen critical variables.

RESULTS

Backgrounds, Countries, and Success of Travel by Gender

Table 1 details the distribution of background variables including gender, race, mental health status, education, age when they first attempted to travel, marital status prior to travel attempts, whether they were employed, the year they first attempted to travel, their immigration status in Canada prior to travel, the ideology that motivated their attempt to become a FTF, and whether they had at least one successful/unsuccessful travel attempt (not mutually exclusive).² Of the 129 FTFs, 111 were male (86.0%) and 18 were female (14.0%). No Canadian FTFs appeared to identify outside of a binary measurement of gender. Table 2 includes the countries of birth for all individuals, and Table 3 lists the provinces that the FTFs were living in prior to their travel. As displayed in Table 1, there was considerable missingness on certain variables like education and employment. This is because certain information was often not reported in media coverage or listed in case files, court documents, or other sources.

² Table 1 splits continuous and categorical variables for ease of interpretation.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Total and by Gender

	Total Sample (N=129)			Males (N=111)			Females (N=18)		
Variable	Obs.	Mean	SD	Obs.	Mean	SD	Obs.	Mean	SD
Age at First Travel Attempt	110	25.673	6.969	94	25.819	6.923	16	24.813	7.405
Year of First Travel Attempt	125	2008.688	7.473	108	2007.935	7.631	17	2013.471	3.907
Variable	Obs.	Proportion		Obs.	Proportion		Obs.	Proportion	
Female	129	0.140		---	---	---	---	---	---
Race									
White	121	0.157		104	0.106		17	0.471	
MENA	121	0.554		104	0.577		17	0.412	
Black	121	0.157		104	0.173		17	0.059	
Asian	121	0.099		104	0.115		17	0.000	
Hispanic	121	0.017		104	0.010		17	0.059	
Indigenous	121	0.008		104	0.010		17	0.000	
Other	121	0.008		104	0.010		17	0.000	
Mental Health	129	0.101		111	0.090		18	0.167	
Education									
Did not graduate high school	69	0.043		61	0.033		8	0.125	
High school	69	0.203		61	0.230		8	0.000	
At least some post-secondary	69	0.681		61	0.656		8	0.875	
Graduate school or above	69	0.072		61	0.082		8	0.000	

Marital Status Prior to Travel							
Single	129	0.721		111	0.757	17	0.471
Cohabiting but not married	129	0.016		111	0.018	17	0.000
Married	129	0.225		111	0.198	17	0.412
Separated or Divorced	129	0.039		111	0.027	17	0.118
Employed	56	0.821		54	0.852	2	0.000
Immigration Status							
Citizen	125	0.896		107	0.879	18	1.000
Permanent Resident	125	0.064		107	0.075	18	0.000
Temporary Visa	125	0.016		107	0.019	18	0.000
Applied for Legal Status, Denied	125	0.024		107	0.028	18	0.000
Ideology							
Radical Islam	129	0.977		111	0.976	18	0.889
Far-right	129	0.008		111	0.012	18	0.000
Far-left	129	0.016		111	0.000	18	0.111
At Least 1 Successful Travel Attempt	129	0.860		111	0.846	18	0.944
At Least 1 Unsuccessful Travel Attempt	129	0.202		111	0.198	18	0.222

Note: Due to rounding, variables may not sum exactly to 1.000.

While the number of female FTFs is small in absolute terms at 18, gendered distinctions are still worthy of attention. First, while small, the percentage is comparable or more than many terrorist databases which often see around 10% women or less (e.g. Freilich et al. 2014). Second, we know that recruitment efforts for men and women and their experiences abroad vary dramatically. Combining men and women together thus obfuscates key dynamics. Put differently, the small size does not affect our interest in answering our three key research questions.

At the same time, 18 terrorist fighters represent a small number from which it would be a mistake to draw broad inferences about patterns, trends, and futures. With a small number like 18, variation in the characteristics of just one or two fighters could significantly alter evaluations. It is best to view these data as authoritative, but with limitations on our ability to generalize them broadly due to the data's absolute size.

Race was missing for seven males and one female, but the data demonstrates divergent patterns for males and females. While only 10.6% of male FTFs with a known race were White, this racial category accounted for 47.1% of females. 57.7% of male FTFs were Middle Eastern/North African (MENA), which was the second most common category for females (41.2%). 17.3% of males were Black, but only 5.9% of females. There were no female

FTFs who fell in the categories of Indigenous (<1.0% of males, or one individual), Asian (11.5% of males), or Other (<1.0% of males).

Our data included two measurements of mental illness, one where there was evidence of some sort of mental health history (included here), and a more conservative measure where we uncovered information about a specific diagnosis (available upon request). 10.1% of the sample had some evidence of mental health issues in the past, which had a higher rate among female FTFs (16.7%) than males (9.0%). As mentioned, the highest level of education achieved by FTFs was only available for 69 FTFs (61 males and eight females). The majority of individuals regardless of gender had at least some post-secondary education when education status was known (68.1% of males and 87.5% of females). While many FTFs traveled or attempted to travel more than once, to standardize the measurement of age, we have calculated it for their first travel attempt, which is available for 110/129 FTFs (94/111 males and 16/18 females). Males attempted to travel for the first time at an average age of 25.8, and females at 24.8. Due to the inordinate influence of some early travelers on the average year of travel as determined by the mean, while only the mean is in Table 1, we provide both the means and medians of the year of first travel attempt herein. The mean first travel attempt occurred in 2008.7 for the whole sample, and the median was

2012. This was considerably earlier for males (mean=2007.9, median=2011.5) than for females (mean=2013.5, median=2014).

Marriage is known to play a role in many FTFs' travel (Perešin, 2015), either by - traveling with their partners, or traveling with future marriage as a goal. Therefore, we collected information on their marital status prior to travel.³ Here we see important differences between males and females. 75.7% of males but only 47.1% of females were single before traveling. 19.8% of males and 41.2% of females were already married, connecting to cases such as that of Canadians Helena Carson and her husband Yazan Kalouti, FTFs who traveled as married couples. However, while this could shed important light on potential recruitment and radicalization patterns for females, our data suggest it should not be used as evidence to diminish the travel of females as only coerced or encouraged by their partners.

Employment data is sparse and should be interpreted with caution. Of the 56 FTFs that we have employment information for, 54 were males (85.2% of which were employed), and two were females, neither of whom had jobs. This missingness could mean that many FTFs are unemployed prior to travel (the media or case files cannot

report a job that does not exist). For females specifically, the missingness could reflect two possible patterns. It may mean that female FTFs were less likely to be employed prior to travel and thus do not have jobs to be reported on, or it could reflect that employment is viewed as a less central factor in women's identities compared to men's and thus is reported less often. It should also be noted that, given the open-source collection methods implemented, certain personal details, such as employment or mental health, are often not publicly disclosed (Dmello & Bichler, 2020; Chermak, Frelich, Greene-Colozzi & Klein, 2025). Again, as there is merit to both potential explanations, employment information should not be relied upon too heavily. Jobs held by FTFs prior to travel were also wide-ranging (not shown here but available upon request). For example, there were two past or current members of the Canadian Armed Forces, three students, ten business owners, and a variety of other jobs including professor, personal trainer, data scientist, restaurant workers, and carpenters.

All female FTFs were Canadian citizens. For males, 87.9% were Canadian citizens, 7.5% were permanent residents, 1.9% had temporary (non-tourist) visas, and 2.8% had applied for legal status (like asylum) but were denied and stayed regardless.

³ Following the convention established by other databases using open-sources such as the Extremist Crime Database, a lack of evidence is coded as the default or null status for variables that are commonly only reported when divergent from

null (e.g., has mental illness, is married) such as mental health and marital status. Therefore, unless any evidence was present otherwise, individuals were coded as single or without mental illness.

Combined, 89.6% were Canadian citizens (four people were missing citizenship status data). Further details on nativity and gender are described in Table 2, but importantly, the majority of male FTFs were not born in Canada while 83.3% of female FTFs were. Ideology motivating the FTFs also showed important differences between genders. While the majority of both adhered to radical Islamic related ideologies (97.6% of males and 88.9% of females), one male (1.2%) was motivated by a far-right ideology. No females followed a far-right ideology and instead, 11.1% (two individuals) of the females belonged to far-left ideological movements, while no males did.

FTFs may travel multiple times – some of those attempts may be successful and they may fail or be foiled in other attempts. Therefore, individuals may have both successful and unsuccessful travel attempts. 86.0% of the sample successfully traveled for terrorist purposes at least once, and 20.2% had at least one unsuccessful attempt. Almost all females (94.4%) were successful at least once, and 22.2% of them had an unsuccessful attempt record. The rate of success for males was lower at 84.6%, and 19.8% of males had an unsuccessful attempt. This is an important finding that highlights the fact that females may be less scrutinized by security while traveling, leading to more successful attempts.

Tables 2 and 3 show the birth countries and provinces of residence for the FTFs and again demonstrate divergent patterns by gender.

Table 2: Nativity by Gender

Country of Birth	Males (N=111)	Females (N=18)
Algeria	8 (7.2%)	1 (5.6%)
Bangladesh	2 (1.8%)	0
Canada	51 (46.0%)	15 (83.3%)
Egypt	4 (3.6%)	0
England	1 (0.9%)	0
Ethiopia	1 (0.9%)	0
Iran	1 (0.9%)	0
Kuwait	4 (3.6%)	0
Lebanon	4 (3.6%)	0
Morocco	5 (4.5%)	0
Pakistan	5 (4.5%)	0
Philippines	1 (0.9%)	0
Russia	1 (0.9%)	0
Saudi Arabia	1 (0.9%)	0
Somalia	7 (6.3%)	1 (5.6%)
Sudan	2 (1.8%)	0
Syria	2 (1.8%)	1 (5.6%)
Trinidad	2 (1.8%)	0
Tunisia	4 (3.6%)	0
Missing	2 (1.8%)	0

Table 3: Providence of Origin by Gender

Province	Males (N=111)	Females (N=18)
Alberta	16 (14.4%)	4 (22.2%)
British Columbia	7 (6.3%)	1 (5.6%)
Manitoba	3 (2.7%)	0
Ontario	53 (47.8%)	6 (33.3%)
Quebec	26 (23.4%)	7 (38.9%)
Missing	6 (5.4%)	0

Figure 1. Province of Origin, Males




Figure 2. Province of Origin, Females



Canada was by far the most common birth country, with 46.0% of males and 83.3% of females being born in Canada. Besides Canada, FTF birth countries were limited to Somalia, Syria, and Algeria for female FTFs, with one born in each country respectively. Males on the other hand had a much wider range of origins. After Canada, the next highest countries of birth were Somalia (6.3%), Algeria (7.2%), Pakistan (4.5%), and Morocco (4.5%). Before attempting travel, Ontario and Quebec were the most common provinces of residence. 47.8% of males lived in Ontario and 23.4% lived in Quebec; 33.3% of females lived in Ontario and 38.9% in Quebec. Outside of Alberta, Manitoba, and BC, no other provinces or territories were represented among FTFs.

Table 4 depicts the ten most common destination countries by gender. Individuals can be associated with multiple countries, as some FTFs had a variety of plans and adjusted as pathways became unavailable. Therefore, it does not sum to the total sample amounts. Percentages shown depict what percent of males or females included that country in their travel plans, and they may have also included others. For example, Samy Nefkha-Bahri was exploring options to go to either Syria or Libya and expressed desire in participating in conflicts in both locations. Overwhelmingly, Syria was the main destination country regardless of gender

(43.2% of males and 77.78% of females). Males were more varied in their plans, with interest in traveling to Afghanistan (10.8%), Somalia (9.0%), Iraq (6.3%), and Pakistan (6.3%) while no females expressed a desire to travel to these countries except for one who intended on Somalia. Russia was the target destination for three male FTFs, Eastern Europe was the desired destination for seven FTFs, and European countries generally for 13 individuals.⁵ Though often ignored as a destination for foreign terrorist fighting due to a heavy emphasis on destination countries overseas and the use of the term international terrorists by American scholars, 11 males (9.9%) and one female (5.56%) attempted to travel to the United States to commit terrorism or join a terrorist network. Here, ideology intertwines with gender as the lone far-right male FTF traveled to the US and the two

Table 4: Top 10 Destination Countries by Gender⁴

Country	Males (N=111)	Females (N=18)
Afghanistan	12 (10.8%)	0 (0.0%)
Algeria	3 (2.7%)	0 (0.0%)
Iraq	7 (6.3%)	0 (0.0%)
Mexico	0 (0.0%)	2 (11.1%)
Pakistan	7 (6.3%)	0 (0.0%)
Russia	3 (2.7%)	0 (0.0%)
Somalia	10 (9.0%)	1 (5.6%)
Syria	48 (43.2%)	14 (77.8%)
Turkey	2 (1.8%)	1 (5.6%)
United States	11 (9.9%)	1 (5.6%)
Missing	5 (5.9%)	1 (5.6%)

⁴ Amounts may not sum to sample size as some travelers were associated with multiple destination countries.

⁵ Individual countries not pictured in this table but available upon request.

far-left FTFs went to Mexico (11.1% of females).

Table 5 presents the most common groups affiliated with Canadian FTFs. As a reminder, individuals can be associated with more than one group as they often traveled or attempted to travel with the intention of joining a number of terrorist organizations depending on their radicalization, group recruitment trends at the time, feasibility of logistics, connections, multiple travel attempts, and opportunity. Therefore, an individual can be associated with intending to join more than one group. Table 5 denotes the groups with the highest proportions of confirmed group association or intention; there are a number of FTFs who had general ideological desires for association (e.g., an anarchist group,

Group Name	Canadian FTFs Associated (N=129)
ISIS	61 (47.7%)
al-Qaeda	30 (23.4%)
al-Shabaab*	11 (8.6%)
Al-Nusrah Front/Jabhat al-Nusra	6 (4.7%)
Taliban	2 (1.6%)
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)	2 (1.6%)

*1 individual not included in this proportion intended to join the Union of the Islamic Courts (ICU) who is associated with the creation of al-Shabaab. However, the connection to al-Shabaab was not explicit.

⁶ All missing on death were last seen abroad and haven't been seen in multiple years (including some who haven't been seen since the American

Chechen extremists, Khalistani movement) but the exact group was not able to be confirmed.

Outcomes: Death, Return, and Criminal Justice

For clarity, we present a brief summary of outcomes related to death and return to delineate major patterns and specific exceptions:

- Of the 129 Canadian FTFs, 80 are believed to be alive and 29 are believed to be deceased, with this status missing for 20 individuals.⁶
- Of the 29 believed to be deceased, cause of death was known for 16 of them.
 - Ten were killed by military action (country unspecified).
 - Seven were killed by other terrorist groups or those involved in the conflict.
 - Five were killed by law enforcement.
 - Four individuals committed suicide.
- One individual (Ahmad Waseem) was arrested and charged in Canada but is now believed to be in Syria. Whether he is alive is unknown (Kwong, 2014).
- Three other individuals were arrested prior to successful travel, were

invaded). It is likely that many are dead but there is no evidence to determine this.

released, then successfully traveled, and are now dead. An additional man was detained, successfully traveled after release, and was convicted in another country.

- Of the 129 FTFs, 67 successfully left Canada to never return. 40 others attempted to return at least once, but only 38 were successful.
- 37 of the successful returnees are known to be alive.
 - While only four successful returnees have never been arrested, 22 people who successfully returned were never convicted of a crime.

Before providing information on criminal justice outcomes (depicted in Figures 3-5), it is important to clarify eligibility criteria. For example, to be eligible for a conviction, one must first be charged. Figures 3-5 include a Sankey diagram showing the numbers and eligibility for each outcome (i.e., charge, arrest, adjudication method, conviction, and sentence length). There are a few important caveats:

- 1) There is some visualized attrition from stage to stage, as sometimes we know a person was arrested or charged, but there is no information about future steps (or they have not happened yet).
- 2) The below figures are based on the 79/129 people for which we have

outcome information. Of the other 50 individuals who are not included in the Figures, 24 died without being arrested or charged (all males). An additional four women and eight men were never arrested or charged and are believed to be alive (either in Canada or abroad). All of the women who were never charged or arrested did not return to Canada. One male served two terrorist related sentences (domestic issues) prior to becoming a FTF and eventually fleeing to Syria, where he was later killed. Lastly, 14 males have presumably been killed but there is no specific confirmatory evidence of their death, and they have never been arrested or charged.

- 3) Of the 79 individuals that we have information for, some individuals were arrested and not charged. This is often because their arrest or detention occurred outside of Canada and they were held without charge, or because they are viewed as dangerous but there is reluctance to charge due to the complications of crimes of this nature occurring in another country or jurisdiction. In some cases, a peace bond has been placed on FTFs in lieu of proceeding with charges or prosecution. Therefore, some individuals have been arrested and placed on peace bonds and may face further action at a later point.

- 4) Not all arrests/charges have occurred in Canada. Of the 73 confirmed to have been arrested in Figure 3, 34 arrests included Canada as an eventual custodial government. Otherwise, countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, the US, Turkey, and Mexico (among others) have detained Canadian FTFs. Of the 58 with confirmed charges, 31 individuals were charged by Canada.


Figure 3 details the known criminal justice outcomes for Canadian FTFs. Overall, there are 16 individuals who were arrested and never charged, three that did not have charges placed against them but did receive peace bond conditions, and two where charging information is unclear. Additionally, six people who were charged and never arrested (charged in absentia). Five people were charged and evaded capture, and eight individuals were arrested and faced charges but ultimately received peace bonds in addition to those who had peace bonds and no charges. 52 people were both arrested and charged, and of those, 17 are known to have pleaded guilty, 20 went to trial (one additional individual has an unknown adjudication method) and four had their charges dismissed. Some individuals have not yet been adjudicated, and others were released or deported following lengthy detentions. Of those who went to trial, only one is known to have been acquitted. Lastly, of the 36 FTFs found guilty, 35 received sentences that

included periods of incarceration, including individuals who received credit for time already served, and one did not face incarceration.

Outcomes by Gender

Of the FTFs known to be deceased, all are male (24 died without being arrested or charged for their FTF related crimes). Of the 41 attempted returnees, 11 are female, and one of the five with an unknown returnee status is female. One female (Rida Jabbar) and one male (Wassim Boughadou) were both known to have wished to return, but there is no evidence that either successfully returned. While a higher proportion of females (61.1%) were known to have been charged compared to males (42.3%), it is important to consider that females had a higher rate of successful return (55.6%) compared to males (26.1%), and all of the females are alive and therefore potentially eligible for such outcomes. The following figures depict the criminal justice outcomes for eligible males (Figure 4) and females (Figure 5).


Figure 3. Criminal Justice Outcomes for all FTFs



† Individuals released without charge were often detained abroad where they were innocent or subjected to torture.

‡ One individual convicted also received a peace bond; this is not reflected in the diagram.


Figure 4: Criminal Justice Outcomes for Male FTFs



† Individuals released without charge were often detained abroad where they were innocent or subjected to torture.

‡ One individual convicted also received a peace bond; this is not reflected in the diagram.

Figure 5: Criminal Justice Outcomes for Female FTFs



Of the 111 males, 59 were arrested at one point for connection to their attempts to join a terrorist network abroad. 29 total are deceased, but three of those were arrested prior to their eventual death, and five received charges (two received both charges and were arrested). Sixteen males who were arrested were not charged including two who received peace bonds, and six who were charged were not arrested. 14/18 females were arrested, and while one was released without charge, one received a peace bond, and one remains detained abroad. No females were charged in absentia.

Strikingly, 42.9% of females were diverted via peace bonds, compared to 7.3% of males. Additionally, one of the 14 (7.1%) female FTFs had her charges dismissed while two of the 55 (3.6%) male FTFs did as well. Five (35.7% of those with CJS contact) total women went through an adjudication process; two pleaded guilty, two went to trial, and one through an unknown process. On the other hand, 33 men (60.0% of those with CJS contact) were adjudicated, with 15 pleading guilty and 18 going to trial. While all 5/5 females were known to be convicted, one male was acquitted and one case involving a male FTF lacks information on the verdict. All of the convicted men were sentenced to incarceration while 20% of the females received a sentence that did not include incarceration.

Patterns Over Time

As seen in the descriptive statistics, the average year of first travel is markedly different for males and females. Beyond this important distinction, there may be other patterns of note over time. Therefore, we include the below figures to show the first year of travel by gender (Figure 6), year of first travel and group membership for each gender (Figure 7), the first year of travel for Canadians and foreign-born individuals (Figure 8), and the first year of travel for those with successful attempts compared to unsuccessful (Figure 9). It should be noted that with one exception, all first travel attempts occurred from 1990-2019. One individual was removed from the below figures as his first travel attempt occurred in 1980. He returned to Canada and later traveled again in the 1990-2025 period and is therefore eligible for sample inclusion generally, but his data is an outlier for these purposes.

Figure 6. Year of First Travel by Gender




Figure 7. Year of First Travel by Gender and Group Affiliation




Figure 8. Year of First Travel by Nativity





Figure 9. Success of Travel Attempts by Year of First Travel



In Figure 6, everyone who traveled is represented (except for the 1 individual from 1980). The clear patterns visible here showing a spike around 2011 for males, 2013 for females, prompted further examination by group membership as this overlaps with the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War and growth of ISIS. In Figure 7, we can visually examine patterns of initial travel attempts by gender and group affiliation for the top 3 most common groups. In total, 15 women and 46 men attempted to join ISIS, 31 men (no women) attempted to join al-Qaeda, and 10 men and 1 woman attempted to join al-Shabaab. No travel abroad attempts were made by females prior to 2000, and the vast majority occurred post-2013 in accordance with the rise of ISIS. Males on the other hand, initiated travel in the 90s and early 2000s, usually associated with al-Qaeda. There was a marked drop-off in male travel following the American invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and of Iraq in 2003.

To further examine patterns over time, Figure 8 displays the year of first travel attempt for individuals who are foreign-born or born in Canada. Interestingly, prior to 2001 and the events of 9/11, few Canadian born individuals attempted to travel. However, this later dramatically shifted, with Canadians first outpacing first attempts by those who are foreign born in 2009 but consistently more present following 2012.

First attempts by individuals who are foreign-born remained relatively constant outside of the period from 2005-2010 where only 2 foreign-born individuals attempted travel. This again overlaps with the post-9/11 surveillance and security era, as well as the American invasion of Iraq.

Lastly, Figure 9 provides information about success of travel attempts over time through the year of first travel. 111 individuals had successful travel attempts and 26 had unsuccessful attempts, with 9 having both⁷ and 1 having neither (Shehroze Chaudhry was accused of and investigated for attempting to travel but this was later determined to be a hoax). In an ideal world, all attempts by each individual would be separately captured and assessed but it was not feasible with open-source data. Instead, this depicts how many individuals had at least 1 successful attempt (the top) or at least 1 unsuccessful attempt (the bottom) based on the year they first traveled. Figure 9 demonstrates that prior to 2014, FTFs from Canada tended to be relatively successful - it is not until 2014 that unsuccessful attempts grow to rival any proportion of successful attempts, and only 2016 has more individuals traveling for the first time with unsuccessful attempts than successful.

⁷ These 9 individuals are represented in 1998 (1), 2000 (1), 2010 (1), 2012 (2), 2013 (1), 2014 (1), 2016 (1), and 2019 (1).

DISCUSSION

Within our sample, Canadian FTFs, on average, were largely male, varied by race, had some level of post-secondary education, were single, employed, Canadian citizens, and were approximately 25 years of age when they first attempted travel. The majority of our sample subscribed to radical Islamic ideologies and had at least one successful travel attempt. These general demographics contradict much of the ongoing false narratives in the political sphere about foreign terrorist fighters. For example, given that 84.7% of male and 100% of female FTFs in the sample were Canadian citizens, governmental policy around migration restriction as a prevention method for countering violent extremism would not be effective for preventing foreign terrorist fighter engagement. Another common narrative is that increased education could be a strong protective factor against violent extremism (Stephens, Sieckelink & Boutellier, 2021). However, our sample indicates that most of Canada's FTFs were engaging with post-secondary institutions, suggesting a relatively well-educated cohort (consistent with other studies of extremism, such as Ismail et al., 2020). This finding does not invalidate the ability of education to mitigate terrorist recruitment but does encourage us to avoid simplistic associations and explore more complex dynamics.

An additional topic of contention is the relationship between immigration to Canada and those leaving Canada to fight abroad. Multiple countries have sought to restrict migration as a form of enhancing national security. This can be clearly seen in rhetoric from the Trump Administration around the first 'Muslim Ban' in the United States (Fullerton, 2017; Wadhia, 2018) and again with President Trump's Executive Order immediately upon taking office a second time and subsequent Proclamations (Trump, 2025). Historically, other countries, such as Australia, have tightened immigration policy under the guise of national security (Humphrey, 2013). Canada increased restrictions on immigration in 2025 and 2026 also with national security as the justification (Policzer & Lopez, 2026). Our study provides mixed support for these claims as 45.9% of male and 83.3% of female foreign terrorist fighters were born in Canada and lived in Canada's most populous provinces. Further, only about half (55.4%) of the Canadian FTFs identified were racially categorized as from the Middle East and North Africa region, clearly the source of concern for much of the political rhetoric.

Given that Canadian-born individuals are leaving to fight overseas and subsequently seeking to return, this provides further credence to the need to implement social programming initiatives to better divert individuals from leaving as well as rehabilitate returning FTFs for more positive, pro-social reintegration into society. This

aligns with research findings that argue effective approaches increasingly include psychosocial assistance (Rigotti & Barboza, 2021), exit interventions (Malet & Hayes, 2020), community engagement (Grossman & Barolsky, 2019), as well as legal processing to prevent recidivism and reduce stigma (Jawaid, 2017).

While there are some similarities between genders, many key differences are present. Specifically, males were more likely to be from multicultural backgrounds, whereas 47% of female FTFs were coded as White. Similarly, a far higher percentage of females (41.2%) were married prior to travel than their male counterparts (22.5%). Temporally, women began travelling abroad years after male FTFs, with their average date of first departure approximately five and a half years later (2007.9 versus 2013.5). This could be contributed to by changes in policy and focus of their associated groups. For example, ISIS originally did not allow women to engage in combat and focused recruitment on males. However, out of need, this policy later shifted (Pokalova, 2020). Although Islamic extremism was the most common ideology, males alone subscribed to far-right ideologies, while females were the only FTFs to subscribe to far-left ideologies. These differences suggest that social programming could be more effective if it targeted the components of engagement for FTFs better accounted for gender rather than relying on a broader implementation based on ideological leaning alone. While

previous research has found that marriage is common for Canadian FTFs (Harris-Hogan et al., 2025), our data demonstrates that this is predominantly seen in female FTFs prior to travel.

We also found that most of the returning fighters were processed through traditional sanctions (i.e., charged and adjudicated through the criminal justice system) in a way that was explicitly gendered. While females were charged at a higher rate than males (61.1% versus 42.3%), a lot of this is contributed to by the rates of survival and return for females compared to males. In addition, the use of peace bonds rather than pursuing a conviction against charged or arrested females was much more common compared to males. The frequent use of sanctions and incarceration for males may be indicative that Canada's response to FTFs is not adequately considering treatment options for males to help rehabilitate them and prepare them for reintegration into society. Additionally, reintegration programs, particularly for males, should consider whether their methods are reinforcing the very conceptualizations of masculinity that contributed to their actions in the first place (Bloom, 2025; Robinson, 2026; Rothermel & Shepherd, 2023; Stenger, 2024). This is an issue that both the national and provincial governments should prioritize, given the large geographic distribution of cases across the country.

All 29 of the deceased FTFs were male, and females were more likely to return (55.6%) compared to males (26.1%), contributing to the difference in their eventual prosecutions. Consideration should be given to why females are more likely to return than males. Recent cases of returnees (e.g., Helena Carson, Dina Kalouti) have been predominantly female. This could be for a number of reasons including that the perception of threat of a returning FTF is influenced by their gender, or perceptions of their conduct while abroad (direct combat or indirect support) may also be conditional by gender. Other potential explanations could include women returning who were manipulated into travel to begin with, those who were mistreated or abused while abroad, or those who have returned to protect their children. Regardless, there remain Canadian FTFs in detention camps who are seeking return, and there should be a standardized or transparent process for when and why an FTF's return is facilitated.

Along with implications for perception of threat posed by an FTF, of those who were arrested, female FTFs were also more likely to receive peace bonds (42.9% versus 7.3%) and less likely to be sentenced to incarceration (80.0% of convicted females versus 100.0% of convicted males) than their male counterparts, suggesting a bias within the justice system toward relaxed treatment during processing and adjudication. This could also be a result of the differing roles women and men played

within organizations like ISIS, and the varying security threat they are perceived to pose as a result.

The moral imperative for states to repatriate their nationals and ensure fair trials further complicates the situation, particularly when the judicial systems of destination countries may lack the capacity to provide fair proceedings (Brookings, 2015; Mehra & Paulussen, 2019). These legal and moral obligations highlight the need for a nuanced understanding of the responsibilities that states have toward their citizens, emphasizing the importance of upholding human rights even amid security concerns (Brookings, 2015; Mehra & Paulussen, 2019). As governments confront these multifaceted challenges, they must also address the societal implications of their policies on returning FTFs. Public sentiment often sways against repatriation efforts due to fears of terrorism, complicating political will and necessitating careful communication strategies to foster public support for rehabilitation initiatives (Brookings, 2015). Ultimately, achieving a balanced approach that addresses security concerns while also promoting the reintegration of returnees remains a critical challenge for governments globally.

Given the complex challenges states face when dealing with FTFs, a key recommendation is the implementation of flexible pathways for engaging these individuals based on individualized risk, a process that brings together stakeholders

from multiple sectors to more effectively support the returning individuals' reintegration. Indonesia has begun to implement risk assessments as a part of the country's process for making determinations about returning fighters (Wibisono & Maulana, 2023). Results from these assessments can then inform customized response plans. There have already been successes in the violent extremism diversion and de-radicalization space. For example, the United Kingdom and Australia have implemented Fixated Threat Assessment Centres (FTACs) that co-locate police, health, and other key stakeholders to be able to rapidly respond to a returning fighter's needs based on an individualized risk assessment tool (Barry-Walsh, James & Mullen, 2020; James, Kerrigan, Forfar, Farnham & Preston, 2010). Given this geographic dispersion of Canadian FTFs, a model similar to FTACs may prove to be beneficial if incorporated within the Canadian countering violent extremism (CVE) landscape.

All analyzed FTF women in the database are Canadian citizens, and many of the FTF men died in conflicts abroad. Men are often disproportionately dying because they are the ones involved in the conflict, while women take other roles such as marrying and not fighting directly (especially in MENA countries, but as we discuss above that changes across our data-collection time frame). As a result of these patterns, the ongoing FTF resettlement is gendered. The current research project highlights

variations in demographics for Canadian FTFs, noting that gender is associated with deviations within the sample, highlighting the need for the implementation of a model within the Canadian CVE and criminal justice space that is more flexible and resilient to shifting demographics.

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
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